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● Three words help capture the present state of Arctic Ocean governance 
1. Conflict – Jurisdictional disputes still hover over parts of the Arctic 
2. Cooperation – Numerous cooperative agreements and arrangements have 
been forged at the bilateral, regional and global levels 
3. Challenges – A sea of ocean governance challenges still confronts the 
region, e.g., 
+ Sorting out future governance arrangements 
for the central Arctic Ocean (CAO) beyond 
national jurisdiction  
+ Identifying and protecting areas of heightened 
ecological and cultural significance 
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 A three-part “speed cruise” follows 
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1.  Conflict 
      
    Four key jurisdictional tensions relevant to shipping hover over the 
Arctic   
 
(i)  Legal status of the Northwest Passage 
● Canada maintains the NWP consists of internal waters 
+ Drew straight baselines around the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, 
effective January 1, 1986 (full national sovereignty over the internal 
waters enclosed) 
+ Has unilaterally established “zero 
pollution” standards for oil, garbage 
and waste disposals from Arctic  
shipping pursuant to the Arctic  
Waters Pollution Prevention Act  
+ Has imposed special construction, 
design, equipment and crewing standards   (Roach and Smith 1996) 
+  Two main legal foundations for internal waters status  
‒  Historic waters (subject to Canadian exclusive control over many 
years with the aquiescience of other States to the exclusive 
authority) 
‒  Waters within straight baselines drawn around a “fringe of islands” 
along the coast 
+  Two main arguments can be made against the Canadian drawing of 
straight baselines around the Arctic Archipelago 
‒  The islands are not in the “immediate vicinity” 
of the coastline as required by Art. 7(1) of 
the UN Law of the Sea Convention 
‒  The drawing of straight baselines “must not 
depart to any appreciable extent from the  
general direction of the coast” (Art. 7(3)) 
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●  U.S. legal stance – NWP is an international strait subject to the right of 
         transit passage by foreign ships 
+  Transit passage substantially limits controls a coastal State like 
Canada could impose on foreign ships navigating through strait waters 
‒  Coastal State cannot impose its own pollution control or safety at 
sea standards (international standards apply) (Art. 39) 
‒  Coastal State can designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic 
separation schemes for navigation where necessary to promote the 
safe passage of ships but IMO approval is required (Art. 41) 
‒  Coastal State cannot prohibit foreign ship transits because of risky 
cargoes, such as hazardous or radioactive wastes 
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+  Considerable debate exists over whether the Northwest Passage  
has become a “strait used for international navigation” 
‒  Little question that Northwest Passage meets the geographic 
condition set out by the Law of the Sea Convention (Art. 37) 
   (Connecting one part of the high seas or an exclusive  
  economic zone with another part of the high seas or  
  an EEZ) 
‒  Big issue is what constitutes the legal litmus for navigational usage 
  Potential vs. actual usage 
  Volume of traffic required 
  Number of different flagged 
  vessel transits 
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(ii) Tensions over the extent of special legislative and enforcement powers  
       bestowed on coastal States by Article 234 of the Law of the Sea 
       Convention over ice-covered waters 
   ●  Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce  
   non- discriminatory laws and regulations for the  
   prevention, reduction and control of marine  
   pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within 
   the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where 
   particularly severe climate conditions and the  
   presence of ice covering such areas for most of the 
   year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to 
   navigation, and pollution of the marine   
   environment could cause major harm to or  
   irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. 
   Such laws and regulations shall  have due regard 
   to navigation and the protection and preservation 
   of the marine environment based on the best  
   available scientific evidence. (emphasis added) 8 
● Various issues continue to surround the practical implementation of  
Article 234 
+ What exactly does ice-covered waters for “most of the year” mean? 




+ Can Article 234 be used to justify unilateral coastal State imposition of 
ship reporting and possibly routeing measures? 
– Effective 1 July 2010 Canada imposed mandatory reporting 
requirements for certain classes of vessels preparing to navigate within 
the Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services (NORDREG) Zone which 
covers the Shipping Safety Control Zones and other northern waters 
such as Hudson and James Bay 
*  Vessel coverages 
> Vessels of 300 gross tonnage or more 
> Vessels engaged in towing or pushing 
another vessel if the combined gross 
tonnage of the vessel and the vessel 
being towed or pushed is 500 gross tonnage or more 
> Vessels carrying as a cargo a pollutant or dangerous goods or 
engaged in towing or pushing a vessel with such a cargo 
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– A tussle, led by the United States, ensued within the IMO 
*  U.S. questioning whether Canada’s NORDREG system was in 
compliance with SOLAS, chapter V requirements 
> Canada should have worked through the IMO for formal approval 
> A vessel traffic services (VTS) zone may only be made mandatory 
within the territorial sea of a coastal State 
> Not clear that NORDREG gives “due regard to navigation” 
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– Canada responded in a very “diplomatic fashion” 
*  Submitted an explanatory document of its own 
> Clarifying Canada’s reliance on Art. 234 for its unilateral imposition 
of NORDREG 
> Noting that foreign sovereign immune vessels would be requested to 
voluntarily comply with NORDREG 
> Requested IMO to bring the NORDREG 
system to the attention of member 
Governments which in fact occurred 
through an IMO information circular 
(SN.1/Circ. 291, 5 October 2010)  
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(iii) Beaufort Sea boundary between Canada and the United States 
+ Canada claims the 141st meridian as the Beaufort Sea boundary  
- Based upon 1825 Great Britain-Russia Treaty 
- Boundary language of the Treaty refers to the meridian line “in its 
prolongation as far as the Frozen Ocean” 
+ US argues an equidistance line should apply 
- Based upon customary international law relating to maritime 
boundary delimitation 
- Views the 1825 Treaty as only  
delimiting the land boundary 
+ Some 6250 square NM in dispute 
+ Not clear which country has 
jurisdiction over shipping activities 
in the disputed area  
 
     
 
    
(Gray 1997) 
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(iv) Legal status of straits within the Northern Sea Route 
+ The United States also contests Russia’s claim to internal waters status of 
the Vilkitski, Shokalski, Dmitri Laptev and Sannikov Straits and the drawing 
of straight baselines around the associated island groups 
(Lalonde and Lasserre 2014) 
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2.  Cooperation 
 
     Substantial cooperation has occurred at the bilateral, regional and global 
     levels 
 
(i) Bilateral 
     Two quick examples 
●   Canada - USA 
+  Joint Marine Contingency 
Plan for the Beaufort Sea 
(CANUSNORTH, latest 
revision 2013) 
+  North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) which extended 
cooperative surveillance to the maritime domain in May 2006 
+  Informal moratorium on petroleum exploration/exploitation in the disputed 
zone 
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+  In 1988 Canada and the United States reached a “stalemate” Agreement 
on Arctic Cooperation 
‒  Parties agreed to set aside their jurisdictional dispute over the legal 
status of the Passage by “agreeing to disagree” 
‒  United States agreed that its icebreakers would be subject to Canadian 
consent for transits within waters claimed by Canada to be internal 
‒  Countries agreed to share research information regarding the marine 
environment gained through icebreaker navigation 
‒  Clear that commercial and naval vessels not included 
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●  Norway – Russian Federation 
  
+ Treaty on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and 
the Arctic Ocean (2010) 
‒ Boundary dispute festered for over 30 years with 
Russia arguing for a sector line and Norway 
relying on a median line 
‒ Agreement essentially split the difference and 
includes provisions on future cooperation 
concerning fisheries and possible overlapping 
hydrocarbon deposits 
*  Parties agree to apply the precautionary approach 
to the management of shared fish stocks and to  
continue setting total allowable catches, quotas 
and other regulatory measures through the 
Norwegian-Russian Joint Fisheries Commission 
*  Parties agree to negotiate a unitization agreement 




Two main routes for regional cooperation 
● Arctic Council and its “progeny” 
+ The Arctic Council, established pursuant to 
a non-legally binding Declaration adopted in  
Ottawa on 19 September 1996, has become 
the main institutional vehicle for furthering 
 regional cooperation 
– Eight Arctic States included as members 
 * Canada    * Norway 
 * Denmark/Greenland  * Russian Federation 
 * Finland    * Sweden 
 * Iceland    * United States of America 
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–  Indigenous organizations (now six in number) elevated to status of 
Permanent Participants  
*  Aleut International Association 
*  Arctic Athabaskan Council 
*  Gwich’in Council International 
*  Innuit Circumpolar Council 
*  Russian Association of Indigenous                                                                                                  
Peoples of the North (RAIPON) 
*  Saami Council 
–  Six Working Groups established 
*  Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) 
*  Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) 
*  Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) 
*  Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) 
*  Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) (1998) 
*  Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP) (2006) 
19 
– Rotating chairship among Arctic States  (every two years) 
– Ministerial  meetings on a biennial basis 
– Observer status open to 
*  Non-Arctic States 
> First observer  states were France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the United 
Kingdom 
> China, India, Italy, Japan, Singapore and  
South Korea added in May 2013 
*  Inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary organizations 
*  Non-governmental organizations 
– Overall objective is to promote cooperation on common Arctic issues, in 
particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection 
– Substantial limitations in governance 
*  Largely a “talk and study” forum 
*  Cannot address military and security issues 
*  No powers to directly develop regional environmental standards, e.g., for 
oil and gas exploration/development 
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+  Two regional agreements have been negotiated by Arctic Council task 
forces 
‒  Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Agreement 
*  Agreed to at the May 2011 Nuuk Ministerial Meeting 
*  Delineates areas of national search and rescue (SAR) responsibilities 
in the Arctic  
*  Calls for further cooperation in joint exercises and training 






‒  Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and 
Response (2013) 
*  Pledges Parties to maintain effective national oil pollution 
preparedness response systems 
*  Calls for cooperation in response operations 
*  Promotes joint exercises and training 
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+ Arctic Economic Council (AEC) 
‒ Established as an independent organization under Canada’s 
chairship of the Arctic Council. 
‒ Comprised of up to 42 business representatives appointed by the 
eight Arctic States and Permanent Participants 
‒ Tasked with facilitating business opportunities and responsible 
economic development in the Arctic 
‒  Includes various shipping interests, e.g., 
*  Arctia Shipping Ltd. (Finland) 
*  Danish Shipowners’ Association 
*  Norwegian Shipowners’ Association 
*  SOVCOMFLOT (Russian Federation) 
‒ Has met twice (September 2-3, 2014 and April 23, 2015)	  
23 
 Regional cooperative efforts by the five Arctic coastal States (Arctic 5) 
+ 1973 Polar Bear Conservation Agreement 
    Five States having polar bears (Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, 
    Russian Federation, USA) agree  
‒ To protect polar bear dens and ecosystems 
‒ To prohibit takings with few exceptions 
*  Subsistence hunting 
*  “Self-defence” to save 
human life 
*  Scientific purposes 
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+ Arctic 5 Declaration Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Seas 
Fishing in the CAO 
‒ Adopted on July 16, 2015 in Oslo, Norway 
‒ States agreed to various interim measures to address potential 
commercial fishing in the high seas of the CAO 
*  Not authorizing fishing vessels to conduct fishing in the high seas area 
until one or more regional or subregional fisheries management 
organizations or arrangements have established management measures 
*  Establishing a joint scientific research program to promote ecosystem 
understandings 
*  Coordinating monitoring, control and surveillance activities 
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+  Establishment of a new Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission 
(ARHC) 
‒  To facilitate cooperation in undertaking surveys and enhancing 
nautical charting 
‒  Members include Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, USA 
‒  Has met on an annual basis (1st meeting in October 2010) 
 




(iii)  Global 
Arctic-related cooperation fostered primarily through 
 Various multilateral environmental agreements   
 IMO’s Polar Shipping Code (just covered) 
 World-Wide Navigational Warning Service 
+ Cooperative effort of IMO and the International Hydrographic Organization 
+ Globe divided into 21 regions called “NAVAREAS” where countries are 
charged with collecting and issuing navigational warnings through the Global 
Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) 
+ Five NAVAREAS in the Arctic 
 
27 
3.  Challenges 
Because of time constraints, only a “swift six” will be flagged 
 
(i)  Sorting out future governance arrangements for the CAO 
 Arctic 5 Declaration on CAO Fishing (July 2015) is only a “starting point” 
+ Still need to bring other interested States on board 
+ Still need to flesh out a scientific cooperation program 
+ Still need to operationalize cooperation in maritime monitoring, control and 
surveillance 
● Arctic States have yet to agree on whether, and if so, how to take actions 
within the IMO to address future shipping activities in the CAO 
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+ A 2014 report for PAME on Specially Designated Marine                               
Areas in the Arctic High Seas set out various options such as 
‒ Designating the entire high seas as a PSSA with associated                         
protective measures including vessel traffic and ship                                    
reporting systems 
‒ Establishing one or more PSSAs for “core ice areas” with                           
area to be avoided status 
+ At PAME’s September 2014 meeting, a decision was reached to take a 
number of interim steps before pursuing actions within the IMO including 
‒ A paper investigating the possibility for IMO to designate a PSSA located 
entirely on the high seas 
‒ A paper exploring whether dynamic areas to be avoided might be 
established 
‒ Papers have yet to be written 
+ At PAME’s February 2015 meeting, PAME invited AMAP and CAFF to 
denote high sea areas of the CAO particularly vulnerable to international 
shipping activities 
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(ii)  Identifying and protecting areas of heightened ecological and 
cultural significance in national waters 
● The Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine  
Shipping Assessment (AMSA 2009) 
flagged this as a key challenge  
+ Arctic States urged to conduct surveys on Arctic marine use by indigenous 
communities (Recommendation II.A) 
+ Arctic States encouraged to ensure effective coordination mechanisms are 
in place to engage coastal communities in helping to reduce the impacts from 
shipping (Recommendation II.B) 
+ Arctic States urged to identify areas of heightened ecological and cultural 
significance and to take protective measures (Recommendation II.C) 
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● Some progress has been made in identifying significant marine areas with 
a 2013 report prepared by three of the Arctic Council’s working groups 
+ Identified a total of about 97 areas of heightened ecological significance 
comprising more than half of the ice-covered part of the marine Arctic 
+ Admitted the lack of details on areas of heightened cultural significance 
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● Protective routeing measures through the IMO for environmental  
purposes are very limited in Arctic waters 
+  Off Northern Norway 
‒  Traffic separation schemes and recommended routes established 
through IMO effective on 1 July 2007 
‒  Tankers of all sizes and other cargo ships of 5000 gross tonnage  
and over engaged in international voyages are encouraged to 




       
 
     
Source: COLREG. 2/Circ. 58 (2006) 32 
+  Vessel routeings off Alaska 
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‒  Five recommendatory areas to be avoided off the Aleutian Islands 
*  Applicable to ships 400 gross tonnage and above on international 
voyages 
*  Providing 50 NM buffer zones 
*  Approved by the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee at its 95th 
session in June 2015 
*  Measures take effect on January 1, 2016 
(iii) Working out future directions for the Arctic Council 
 Lots of lingering issues, e.g., 
+ How might the engagement of non-Arctic States be strengthened? 
+ How might financing of Arctic Council activities be enhanced? 
‒ Secure funding for Permanent Participant involvements 
‒ Adequate funding for Council projects and assessments 
+ Should additional regional agreements be negotiated? e.g., 
‒ Framework treaty further formalizing the Arctic Council 
and national commitments 
‒ Agreement on offshore oil and gas operational standards 
 
+ How might the “Arctic voice” be better communicated in international 
fora? 
34 
 Some promising avenues from the Arctic Council’s Iqaluit Declaration of 
April 24, 2015 
+ Has tasked Senior Arctic Officials with providing further guidance on 
engaging with Observers 
+ Commits to identifying new approaches to funding Permanent Participants 
+ Decision taken to establish a Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation to 
consider possible ways forward for  
enhancing cooperation including 
through a regional seas program 
+ Directed the Scientific Cooperation 
Task Force to work towards  
completing a legally-binding 
agreement on scientific cooperation 
by the 2017 Ministerial meeting 
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(iv) Conserving Arctic migratory bird populations 
 
 A long neglected issue 
+ At least 279 bird species from outside the Arctic take advantage of the 
highly productive summer breeding seasons 
+ The Arctic hosts some 80% of the global goose populations 
● CAFF Working Group still in the early stages of carrying out priority 
actions under its Arctic Migratory Birds Initiative (AMBI) to strengthen 




(v) Establishing a regional network of MPAs 
 
 The latest Arctic Council initiative to promote the 
establishment of an MPA network suggests a long 
voyage is ahead in moving from paper to practice 
 PAME’s Framework for a Pan-Arctic Network of 
Marine Protected Areas stands out as being 
“politically cautious” 
+ No regional target adopted for MPA designations 
+ Leaving priorities and timelines for possible 
additions of MPAs to each Arctic State 
+ Administrative details yet to be worked out 
● Further “paper steps” promised in PAME’s 
Workplan 2015-2017 
+ Updated inventory of existing Arctic MPAs 
+ Desktop study on area-based conservation measures 
in the Arctic 
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(vi) Further addressing vessel-source 
marine pollution issues (Navigating beyond 
the Polar Code), e.g., 
 Ensuring effective ballast water management 
in polar waters 
 Considering further heavy fuel oil (HFO) 
bans 
 Controlling black carbon emissions 
 Possibly designating one or more Emission 
Control Areas (ECAs) in the Arctic 
- Areas where more stringent air pollution 
controls for SOx, NOx and particulate 
matter might be imposed 
- An Emission Control Area has already 
been established for sea areas off the 
Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Canada and 





General view of the North American Emission Control Area 
(IMO, MEPC.1/Circ. 723, Annex 1, p. 7, 2010) 
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Conclusion 
 Many other challenges relating to Arctic shipping governance hover on 
the horizon but no time to cover   
+ Ensuring sustainable marine tourism development in the Arctic 
+ Further addressing noise pollution from ships 
+ Delineating extended continental shelf boundaries in the Arctic 
+ Ensuring adequate infrastructure to support safe and sustainable northern 
shipping 
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 One final nautical image captures the “bottom line” regarding  
law of the sea and ocean governance in the Arctic 
 An unfinished voyage! 
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